The Freedom Case in the Supreme Court

THE FREEDOM CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT.

GENTLEMEN: From an imperfect knowledge of the circumstances attending the suit for freedom before the Supreme Court, prosecuted by Dred Scott (a negro,) several correspondents of the New York press have made suggestions tending to mislead public opinion. One intimates that the suit was a contrived case, to operate on the late Presidential election, by bringing under the review and judgment of the Supreme Court the questions which have so stirred the public mind since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Another surmises that selfish motives influenced certain distinguished members of the bar in declining the request to lend me their assistance in behalf of my client’s cause; and a third seems to suspect my own in regard to conducting it alone. As the peculiar attitude of political affairs at this moment give much interest to the case, I will be pardoned for giving a brief narrative of it, and especially as the simplest statement of the facts will vindicate the gentlemen whose motives have been impugned for unwillingness to appear in the cause, and at the same time vindicate the cause itself from the imputation of having been brought to subserve a party purpose.

This case is a suit for the` freedom of the plaintiff, Dred Scott, and of his wife and two children. In 1834, Dred Scott was taken by his former master, Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the army, to reside at Fort Snelling, on the other side of the Mississippi river, in that part of Louisiana Territory north of 36˚ 30′. Harriet was taken to Fort Snelling in 1835, and was there married to Dred. Their eldest child, Eliza, was born north of 36˚ 30′, on a boat, whilst descending the Mississippi river. The other child, Lizzie, was born at Jefferson Barracks, after they were taken to Missouri, in 1838. The suit was first brought by the administratrix of Dr. Emerson in the Circuit Court of St. Louis co., in the State of Missouri, and that Court, following the uniform decisions on such facts of the courts of Missouri ever since it was an organized Territory, gave judgment for the plaintiff. An appeal was, however, prosecuted, and a majority of the Supreme Court of the State, at the March term of 1852, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, because "the times now are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then, not only individuals, but States, have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to Slavery, whose gratification is sought in the persuit of measures whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our Government. Under such circumstances, it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measures which might countenance this spirit."

When the case was remanded, under this opinion, the plaintiff’s attorney dismissed the suit in the State court, and Major Sanford, a citizen of New York, having in the mean time purchased Dred and his family, an action for trespass for false imprisonment was brought against Sanford in the Circuit Court of the United States on the 2d of November, 1853, by Dred Scott as a "citizen" of Missouri. The defendant denied the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that Dred was a negro, and therefore not a "citizen." But the Circuit Court held that he was a citizen, if free, within the meaning of that section of the Constitution which provides for the maintenance of suits in courts of the United States between citizens of different States. The defendant then denied that Dred and his family were free, and on the 15th of May, 1854, the court decided that they were slaves, because the Supreme Court of the State had so decided on the same fact. From this judgment, Dred appeared to the Supreme Court of the United States, to the December term of 1854.

I was in California when the record of this case was filed in the Supreme Court. The efforts made to obtain counsel for the plaintiff prior to my return had not met with success. On my return, I received a letter from Mr. Fields, (who is a distinguished lawyer in Missouri, and one who never, during the fifteen years I have known him, manifested any interest in politics,) requesting me to present the case to the court.

In Missouri, and generally, I believe, in the Southern States, almost every lawyer feels bound to give his services, when asked, in such a case, arising in the community to which he belongs. Having risen at that bar, (considering myself still a citizen of Missouri, although for the present pursuing my profession at the seat of Government,) I did not hesitate to become the counsel for the plaintiff here, as I should have done there.

As I perceived that the cause involved important issues, which might possibly be engulphed in the great political controversy then just emerging in relation to the power of Congress over territory of the United States, I felt it my duty to seek assistance, especially as when I found arrayed against me the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Geyer) and the late Attorney General, (Mr. Johnson,) among the first men of the profession, of the East and the West. I sought to obtain the support of one of the ablest men at the bar in the South, and he had almost consented to yield it. His inclination was surrendered, not, I well know, from the selfish motive given in the press. I then applied to leading members of the profession in the North, and with the same result. The mercenary motive imputed for the reluctance shown to engage in it is equally unjust to all. The truth is, while some gave it up because their previous engagements interrupted, and others because the late application did not give time to make preparation, all perceived that, from the nature of the case, it must assume an aspect more or less affecting the party struggles impending, and were unwilling, on all accounts, to add to this embarrassment of the cause, or that of the party with which they stood connected, by implicating either themselves or it by their action in the result. While I do myself deprecate the state of things which brings a political and a partisan influence to act upon the public mind in connection with this case, and while willing to avoid it as much as possible, I yet felt it was my duty to call to its support all the aid I could command. When I first opened the case, therefore, I announced to the court the regret I felt in not having prevailed in getting an associate in the cause, and I repeated the expression of my solicitude on opening the reargument at the present term; and I am happy to acknowledge its good effect in enlisting the great ability and learning or Mr. Curtis, of Boston, to maintain the constitutionality of the power exerted by Congress, on which the freedom of my client depends. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

M.Blair.